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Aid, Policies and Long-Run Growth
Abstract
This paper analyses the relationship between aid, policies and growth in 54 countries over 45 years.
Specifically it hypothesises that if aid affects growth then it does so over a long period of time and that
the extent to which this is true depends on an individual country’s policy environment. This paper both
finds no direct relationship between aid and growth, and that the effectiveness of aid does not depend on
the policy environment. This paper therefore adds to the existing evidence showing that Burnside and
Dollar’s (2000) result of aid effectiveness does not have external validity.
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Aid, policies and long-run growth

1. Introduction
For the first time in human history the alleviation of global poverty and universal economic development
is seen as an achievable and important goal (Millennium Development Goals). Aid (in all its many forms)
is often cited as a crucial means to achieve this end (e.g. the UN’s long-standing target of 0.7% of rich
countries’ GNP to be spent on aid). These aid disbursements continue to grow despite considerable
academic ambiguity over the effectiveness of such transfers. Recently the logic that aid can have a
considerable (and immediate) positive effect in the presence of developmental policies has received new
life with the publishing of a paper by Burnside and Dollar (2000). My paper argues that the total effect of
aid on growth can only be apparent in the long run, and this has implications for the analysis of the effect
of aid in different policy environments.

This paper is going to broadly follow the logic of Burnside and Dollar in the assertion that aid may have a
positive effect on growth in the presence of good policies. I will deviate from their paper by critiquing
their definitions of aid and policy (but I acknowledge that my choices of variables are more symptomatic
of ‘overall good governance’ than vitally important in their own right). More fundamentally I note that
macroeconomic studies of aid effectiveness have historically failed to consider the effect of aid over long
periods of time (often due to data limitations), as is necessary to fully identify the aid’s impact. Burnside
and Dollar argue that analysing the direct impact of a four year average of aid on the contemporaneous
four year average of growth correctly identifies the effectiveness of aid. I dispute this and will analyse the
data over a long period of time to account for the time taken to both invest the aid and for that investment
to become productive.

2. Literature Review
Easterly (2006) estimates that over the last fifty years $2.3 trillion of aid has been disbursed, a
considerable percentage of that over the last decade with the expressed intention of development. This has
1
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been recommended by leading economists (e.g. Sachs, 2005) who argue that aid can be crucial in
enabling countries to break out from a ‘poverty trap’. However critics of aid claim that there is little
historical evidence of aid promoting growth, indeed “the top quarter of aid recipients…received 17% of
their GDP in aid over the last 42 years, yet also had near-zero per capita growth” (Easterly, 2007).
These critics argue that those receiving aid have considerable incentives to renege on agreements and
appropriate aid for private consumption with little threat of retribution (Bauer, 1976). Aid can even
weaken a government’s developmental performance through reducing the incentives to adopt good
policies and reform inefficient institutions (Heller and Gupta, 2002). Overall “the debate about aid
effectiveness is one where little is settled” (Rajan, 2005).

Given the critical stakes involved much research has been undertaken into what makes aid more effective.
It has long been theorised that ‘poor countries with sound economic policies benefit directly from the
policies, and in this environment aid accelerates growth” (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Burnside and
Dollar (henceforth BD, 2000) authored a highly influential paper which aimed to empirically analyse the
relationship between foreign aid, economic policies and growth of per capita GDP. They hypothesised
that the extent to which aid would be effective depends on the extent to which it is invested. Because
investment decisions and subsequent productivity are negatively affected by policy distortions BD
claimed that countries with ‘better’ policies would see more growth as a result of the aid. They robustly
found that aid has had a ‘positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary
and trade policies but little effect in the presence of poor policies.’

This paper has been seized upon by those involved in the aid industry as evidence that aid can be
effective, indeed the paper has been cited by several development agencies as justification for selectively
increasing aid flows (Easterly, 2003). However do the empirical results stand up to further scrutiny?
Many economists have critiqued BD’s work, including Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dalgaard and Hansen
(2001), Guillamont and Chauvet (2001), Collier and Dehn (2001), Lensink and White (2001), Collier and
Dollar (2002) and Easterly et al (2004). These papers considered variants on the BD model with
2
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inconclusive results, some of these papers endorsed BD’s finding whilst others found contrary evidence,
e.g. Easterly et al. (2004) who expanded the dataset to include more years and countries and saw the
significance of the relationship disappear. Easterly (2003) makes the important point that ‘choosing the
appropriate specification often means there are more plausible right-hand side variables than there are
data points in the sample.” This has an implication for my work; rather than trying to exhaustively
identify every relevant variable I should instead select those variables which are symptomatic of a broader
concept (of commitment to development).

Although I re-evaluate the definitions of aid and policy most fundamentally I argue that, if aid impacts
growth, it will take time to do so. Aid given to build a road, or to buy textbooks for a school or to equip a
new hospital will not predominately have an immediate impact on growth. My model therefore allows for
this by looking at the impact of past (and present) aid on present growth. A currently circulating IMF
working paper (Minoiu and Reddy, 2009) addresses the impact of aid on growth over the long run,
finding that development aid has a robust and strong impact on growth. Their work does briefly consider
the interaction of policies over the long run (and finds no evidence that aid raises growth only in ‘good’
policy environments) but does not consider it in detail.

In conclusion there is much academic ambiguity about the effectiveness of aid. Whilst it is commonly
argued that the effectiveness of aid depends on a country’s policies there are no empirical specifications
that seek to analyse the relationship between aid and policy whilst giving particular attention to the time
frame involved, and it is this anomaly that my paper will seek to address.

3
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3. The Model
I can investigate the long-run impact of aid on growth by estimating the following model:
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′     ′   

  ′     ′   

′      

  ′ 



 

(1)

(2)

(3)

where i indexes countries, t indexes time, j indicates a time lag, git is per capita real GDP growth, yit is the
logarithm of real per capita GDP, ait is aid receipts relative to GDP, pit is a P x 1 vector of policies that
affect growth, zit is a Z x 1 vector of other exogenous variables that might affect growth, xit is an X x 1
vector of other exogenous variables that might affect aid, gt, pt and at are fixed time effects and εgit, εait and
εpit, are mean zero scalars. I construct my model by using the existing literature to select variables that
belong in the policy and exogenous vectors. Some of the variables that belong in the growth equation do
not belong in the policy or aid equations while the same is true for some variables in the aid and policy
equations (these zero restrictions allow me to achieve identification of the model). The equations are
estimated using data from 1960 to 2004 averaged over nine five-year periods, from 1960-1964 through to
2000-2004.

a) What determines growth?
I use the literature to develop a model of growth which depends on a variety of political and institutional
variables, the aim of this is to control for a range of factors in order to identify the true impact of aid on
growth. Firstly, lagged real per capita GDP is included in this regression because of convergence growth
theory (Solow, 1957).

The exogenous variables include a measure of institutional quality (Knack and Keefer, 1995),
ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (Easterly and Levine, 1997), lagged (to eliminate potential endogeneity)
M2 as a percentage of GDP (Levine, 1997) and dummy variables for sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia.
4
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These variables have all been suggested by the literature as suitable exogenous variables (assassinations
as a measure of political unrest was also considered but data was not available over the full time period).

I now consider which variables should be considered for the policy vector. Carroll and Carroll (1997)
examine the successful case of Botswana and emphasise that the incentives were correctly aligned; that is
the ‘politicians had personal commitment to economic development’. As I am trying to proxy a
government’s commitment to development I have been guided by the literature to choose political
variables that are symptomatic of this. Whilst BD utilise the highly subjective Sachs-Warner variable to
proxy openness I am going to use the black market premium which is an effective way of showing trade
distortions (Rodrik and Rodríguez, 2000). Fischer (1993) argues that inflation (GDP deflator) is
negatively associated with growth (this can be controlled by monetary policy). Alogoskoufis and Ploeg
(1991) show that running persistent budget deficits can lead to reduced savings and lower growth, hence I
also include the budget surplus/deficit (% GDP). The degree to which the population is educated is also
cited in the literature as being important for growth (e.g. Jamison, Jamison and Hanushek, 2007) and as
such the percentage of children in primary education is included (a proxy for the degree of education in the
larger population).

In order to consider the long-run impact of aid on growth I include lagged aid in the equation (two lagged
variables are included: aid lagged one period and the average of aid lagged two periods and aid lagged
three periods) and so that I can see the long-run impact of aid in different policy environments I include
lagged aid interacted with current policy (in a similar fashion). BD define aid as ‘Effective Development
Assistance’ which is solely the grant element of aid. An expanded definition is ‘Official Development
Assistance’ (ODA) which includes loans targeted for development. I believe ODA to be a more accurate
representation of true aid because the recipients are very often considerably liquidity-constrained
(Easterly, 2003) and the loans are highly subsidised.

5
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b) What determines aid?
The determinants of aid is a well researched topic in economics literature. The overarching consensus is
that donors give a large amount of aid strategically (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984). In order to account for
this I include dummy variables for sub-Saharan Africa (much European aid is directed here), the Franc
zone (which receives a disproportionate amount of French aid), Egypt (a strategic American ally) and
Central American countries (also a favoured recipient of American aid). It has also been found that aid is
given to countries with small populations (Neumayer, 2002) and to countries with low incomes (Frey and
Schneider, 1986) so population and lagged GDP per capita are also included in the exogenous vector. It is
also conceivable that some aid is allocated to countries with good policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) so
my policy variables are also included in the model.

c) What determines policies?
I hypothesise that policies are durable; that is the policies in one period depends on policies in the
previous period(s). For example the theory of adaptive expectations implies that inflation in one period is
highly dependent on inflation in the previous period (Carlson and Parkin, 1975).

d) Constructing a policy index
Earlier I identified four policy variables that impact growth to various extents. My results from
Regression One will be difficult to isolate clearly if I am comparing the impact of differing policy
variables, for instance what weightings should I attach to the various policies? Because I postulate that the
effectiveness of aid on growth depends crucially on the policy environment it makes sense to weight these
policies according to their own impact on growth. Furthermore the creation of an index allows me to
clearly distinguish between those countries with ‘good’ policies and those with ‘bad’ policies, a feature
which will prove useful when I come to interpreting the results. I considered the logic that different
regions may differ in their optimal combination of policies to impact growth and introduced interactive
variables between regions and policies to test this. However none of the different regions (Sub-Saharan
Africa, Middle East and North Africa, and Asia) have significantly different combinations of optimal
6
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policy (relative to the default region, the Americas) at the 5% level (see Appendix 1) so I conclude that
there is a global combination of policies that are optimal for growth. I compute this index by estimating
the following regression:



  ′     ′   

     

(4)

and fixing the values of the coefficients that determine the policy index (i.e. pit = bpp’it) where bp is the
OLS estimate of βp in equation two. Then I can estimate the following main regression instead (with a
similar alteration to equations 2 and 3):

     

 



    



 

    ′   

I am conscious that these new equations are restricted versions of the originals and this may lead to
misspecification when I remove
Table One
outliers. For this reason I will re-

(1)

(2)

Growth

LHS

Aid

RHS

LHS

point. Furthermore if the policy

Policy index

RHS

RHS

variables are endogenous in the

Per capita income (Lag1)

RHS

RHS

Institutional quality

RHS

RHS

growth equation I will have bias in

Ethnic fractionalisation

RHS

RHS

these estimates. My specification

M2/GDP (Lag1)

RHS

RHS

evaluate the policy index at that

Population (log)
tests (reported in detail later in the
paper) demonstrate that I can
assume policies to be exogenous
in this instance.

I now

summarise

the

main

equations that I will estimate (with
some variations) in Table One.
LHS indicates that the variable is

7
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LHS
RHS

RHS

Sub-Saharan Africa dummy

RHS

East Asia dummy

RHS

RHS

Egypt dummy

RHS

Franc zone dummy

RHS

Central America dummy

RHS

Aid (Lag1)

RHS

Aid [½(Lag2 + Lag3)]

RHS

Aid*Policy

RHS

Aid (Lag1)*Policy

RHS

Aid [½(Lag2+Lag3)]*Policy

RHS

Education (Lag1)

RHS

Black market premium (Lag1)

RHS

Budget surplus (Lag1)

RHS

Inflation (Lag1)

RHS
7
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dependent whereas RHS indicates the variable is independent. There are unique variables in each
regression which can be used as instruments in (a hypothetical) 2SLS estimation. The assumption that
some variables do not belong in all of the equations (which has been justified by the existing literature)
allows me to achieve identification of the model. In practice the 2SLS estimator is overidentified.

4. Econometric Estimation
I am initially going to estimate this model using Ordinary Least Squares. I believe this is justified unless I
can demonstrate that some of the assumptions underpinning OLS do not hold. Because my dataset is
unbalanced it is prudent to use heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors as suggested by White (1980)
throughout. My Breusch-Godfrey tests for serial correlation (see Appendix 2) reveal none in any of the
regressions except the aid equation (so for these estimates I use the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors as demonstrated by Newey and West (1987)). Computing DickeyFuller tests (see Appendix 3) reveal no evidence of a unit root in any of the key variables. The major
potential problem with OLS in this instance is endogeneity caused by simultaneity bias.

a) Endogeneity
Endogeneity could occur in this instance due to growth and policy or growth and aid being codetermined.
I first consider potential endogeneity (see Appendix 4a for full details of tests) between policies and
growth, that is whether the error terms εgp and εp are correlated. I now need to decide whether estimation
of these equations by OLS would result in bias (i.e. whether the use of instruments is necessary).
Computing a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reveals that the policy index can be assumed to be orthogonal at
the 5% level to the error term in the growth equation and I will therefore consider policy as exogenous in
the growth equation.

The other potential source of endogeneity in my model is that between aid and growth, i.e. whether the
error terms εg and εa are correlated (see Appendix 4b for full details of tests). Computing the Durbin-WuHausman test reveals that I can also consider aid as exogenous in the growth equation. This may be a
8
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surprising result but it is not unique to my data (e.g. Hansen and Tarp, 2001) and inspection of the
estimates generated by 2SLS reveals that they indeed do not deviate substantially from OLS.

b) Different specifications
Assuming that I have correctly specified my model my OLS results (adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation where appropriate) should be consistent. I will initially consider a long-run relationship
between growth and aid. Following this I will then consider whether aid is more effective in different
policy environments (over the long-run) by including aid*policy variables. Finally I will investigate the
removal of outliers and this will highlight a possible need to change my definition of policy.

5. Data (see Appendix 5 for full details of sources)
Many previous analyses of the impact of aid on growth have been characterised by a lack of data over
long periods of time and have therefore been unable to analyse long run effects. I have attempted to get
information for all countries which have received aid since 1960. I have been able to use a World Bank
dataset to provide the majority of my data with information from 1960-2004 on GDP (both levels and
growth rates), official development assistance, M2/GDP, budget surplus/deficit (which was supplemented
by IMF data), primary education rates, population and inflation. I have utilised data from Levine on the
black market premium and ethnic fractionalisation whilst institutional quality is measured in PRS
Group’s IRIS III dataset as described in Knack and Keefer (1995). The dataset is unbalanced and
countries have been removed for which truly insufficient data (classified as data being available for fewer
than three time periods) is available; in total there are 54 countries (see Appendix 6 for a list). The policy
index can only be computed from 1970 onwards, which is satisfactory because the need to lag other
variables means that policy variables before 1970 would not be included in the regression.

Furthermore the countries I am missing data for are not selected at random; it is almost certain that the
reasons why I am missing this data are correlated with variables in my model. Finally I do not include
countries such as Japan and Korea (due to a lack of data pre-1960) which have ‘graduated’ from aid and
9
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this is likely to negatively bias my effect of aid on growth. From a pragmatic perspective there is little I
can do about these issues except acknowledge that my results cannot be assumed to have external
validity.

Logarithms were taken of population, inflation, black market premium and GDP levels both in order to
reduce the impact of outliers and because the theory suggests that a log-linear relationship is most
appropriate in these cases (diminishing returns). Certain variables were assumed not to change over time,
for example ethnic fractionalisation and quality of institutions (information on these variables is not
widely available over time so I justified these assumptions on the logic that institutions and ethnic
fractionalisation change slowly over time). Averages over five year periods (1960-1964, 1965-1969, etc.)
were taken to remove business cycle fluctuations from the analysis (i.e. only medium-to-long term
impacts should be observed).

Summary statistics for my dataset are available in Table Two. It is important to note that aid is a net value
(negative values are possible when the aid is being repaid) and the education variable is calculated by
looking at the number of
Table Two
students in primary education
and dividing it by the number
of

children

of

primary

education ‘age’ (i.e. figures of
over

100%

are

possible).

black

market

Metrics

Mean

Median

S.D.

Min

Max

GDP p.c .(1960)
(PPP - 2005US$)

2032

1704

2233

237

11,175

GDP Growth (%)

1.56

1.58

3.40

-11.84

32.01

Net Aid (% of GDP)

5.85

2.85

6.96

-0.02

35.99

-3.08

-2.27

3.79

-22.20

8.00

55.08

11.27

215.12

-2.68

2792.36

premium and GDP per capita

Budget surplus
(% of GDP)
Black market
premium (%)

all have considerable outliers

Inflation (%)

15.10

8.01

29.17

-92.74

321.37

and this is one of the reasons

Education (% in
primary education)

86.64

95.26

28.87

2.66

167.58

Inflation,

why logarithms were taken.

10

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol7/iss1/5

10

Morley: Aid, Policies and Long-Run Growth

6. Results
a) Constructing a policy index
Table Three
In Table Three I show the results of
regression (4) in order to compute a policy
index. All of the exogenous variables have
the expected sign and moderate explanatory
power. All of these variables will be retained
throughout

the

analysis

(irrelevant

of

significance in individual regressions), in
order to have a directly comparable base
specification. Turning to the policy variables
I can see that, as anticipated, an increase in
the budget surplus, a fall in inflation, a
reduction in the black market premium and
an increase in education all, ceteris paribus,
lead

to

increased

growth.

The

most

(A)
Estimation Method: OLS
Number of Observations: 173
R2: 0.45
Dependent Variable:
GDP p.c. growth
-0.41
Initial GDP
(0.35)
-1.03
Ethnic fractionalisation
(0.99)
0.24
Institutional Quality
(0.15)
-0.001
M2/GDP (lagged)
(0.002)
-1.15
Sub-Saharan Africa
(0.80)
0.83
East Asia
(1.01)
0.09*
Budget Surplus
(0.05)
-4.13**
Inflation
(1.27)
-0.28**
Black Market Premium
(0.14)
0.02*
Education
(0.01)
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level

significant determinants of growth are the black market premium and inflation. Although the budget
surplus and education variables are not significant at the 5% level in this model I have reason to believe
that there is considerable multicollinearity between these variables and the others in the regression
(indeed when I remove inflation from the regression these variables becomes significant). As the
theoretical literature suggests these variables belong in this regression and the four variables are jointly
significant at the 5% significant level I will include all four variables in my policy index.

The policy index is computed using the regression coefficients:
   3.65 % 0.28 ) * + ,

- . /-01 /0.2. % 4.13 ) * 5+ 15

 0.09 ) 72801 92/2:  0.02 ) ;82
11
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The constant 3.65 was found by predicting the growth rate using the mean value of all the other variables
in the regression. In this way the policy index can be thought of as the predicted growth rates of the
country for that time period (assuming mean values of all other variables).

Diagram One demonstrates the high degree of correlation between the policy index and the p.c. GDP
growth rate. As I have already identified no endogeneity in this relationship I can say with confidence that
those countries with ‘better’ policies grow at a faster rate [see also regression (B)].

Diagram One

12
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b) Main Regression
The next stage is to look at the direct impact of aid on growth [regression (1)]. Because lagged values of
aid will display multicollinearity it is important to do a joint test of significance, and the aid variables are
significant at the 5% level.
Table Four

Aid (lagged two/three
periods)

(B)
Estimation Method: OLS
Number of Observations: 148
R2: 0.46
Dependent Variable: GDP
p.c. growth
-0.89**
(0.30)
-0.98
(1.00)
0.35**
(0.15)
-1.59**
(0.71)
0.33
(1.23)
0.007
(0.01)
0.98**
(0.23)
-0.08
(0.07)
0.14*
(0.08)
-0.17**
(0.07)

Aid*Policy

-

Initial GDP
Ethnic Fractionalisation
Institutions
Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia
Money (lagged)
Policy
Aid
Aid (lagged one period)

(C)
Estimation Method: OLS
Number of Observations: 148
R2: 0.48
Dependent Variable: GDP
p.c. growth
-0.89**
(0.30)
-1.23
(1.01)
0.37**
(0.16)
-1.11
(0.72)
0.88
(1.28)
-0.001
(0.01)
0.78**
(0.25)
0.08
(0.10)
-0.36
(0.32)
0.02
(0.39)
-0.05
(0.03)
0.12*
(0.07)
-0.03
(0.09)

Aid (lagged one
period)*Policy
Aid (lagged two/three
periods)*Policy
Prob > F
0.05
(on results in bold)
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level

13
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From these results (B) I can analyse the overall impact on growth of a permanent increase in aid. This
will be δa1 in the first period, δa1 + δa2 in the second period and δa1 + δa2 + δa3 from the fourth period
onwards.

Taking partial derivatives of GDP growth with respect to aid over the long-run reveals:
=)
 
= )

>

  ? 

@

 %0.11

So a sustained one percentage point increase in aid/GDP will, ceteris paribus, lead to a sustained fall in
the growth rate of 0.11%. As discussed in the literature review there are several reasons why aid may
have a negative effect on growth, primarily due to reducing the accountability of the government to the
electorate. However this result is not significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.

The focus of this paper is on the impact of aid on growth in the presence of different policy environments
and the second result (C) shows me what happens when I have a permanent increase in aid in different
policy environments. Because of multicollinearity between all the aid variables it is necessary to do a
significance check and I can see that I am justified in including these variables at the 5% level.
=)
 
= )

>

  ? 

@



> 

 

? 

 

@ 

 %0.27  0.04 )  

Intuitively this result makes sense; aid has a sharply negative impact on growth in a policy environment
of zero (a relatively bad policy environment), whilst it can be seen that for countries with a particularly
good policy environment the impact of aid on growth can be positive. However neither the impact of aid
on growth nor the impact of aid*policy on growth is statistically different from zero at the 5%
significance level.

c) Different specifications
I am now going to investigate whether my results change when I remove outliers from my dataset and reestimate the relationship. I use the Hadi test to identify and remove outliers (see Appendix 7 for full
details). I feel comfortable removing outliers as, although these outliers are genuine results, they will not
14
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be representative of a ‘typical’ relationship between aid, policies and growth. I can justify this by
observing that these outliers are all caused by unique cases, for instance Bolivia, DRC and Nicaragua all
experienced hyperinflation, whilst Rwanda’s increase in aid followed genocide and Oman’s extraordinary
growth was caused by a short-run exploitation of oil reserves. Removing these outliers results in an
interesting change to the significance of the policy variables, it transpires that the significance of the
inflation variable (which was highly significant) and the education variable depends entirely on the
outliers. As a robustness check I will therefore look at two scenarios; one where I consider all the policy
variables (plausibly justified given the degree of multicollinearity between the variables) and one where I
drop the inflation and education variables from the policy index (see Appendix 8 for information about
the construction of these policy indices and the growth regressions).

d) Summary of results
I can summarise these results by looking at the long-run impact of aid (and aid*policy) in the six
econometric specifications that I have outlined.
Table Five
Full dataset
Outliers removed
Outliers removed
=)
(original policy)
(original policy)
(different policy)
)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
=
Table Four Table Four Table Twelve Table Twelve Table Twelve Table Twelve
Aid
-0.11*
-0.27
-0.16**
-0.13*
-0.18**
-0.13
(F-value)
(3.62)
(1.14)
(6.42)
(3.12)
(9.24)
(0.24)
0.04
0.01
-0.02
Aid*Policy
(F-value)
(0.39)
(0.98)
(0.05)
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level

The most interesting result here is that the impact of aid on growth is not dependent on the level of policy.
The partial scatter graph, Diagram Two [from regression (C)], plots the unexplained portion of aid*policy
(unexplained by other right-hand side variables) against the unexplained portion of growth. A data point
where growth controlling for other factors is high and aid*policy (also controlling for other factors) is
high implies that aid is more effective in a good policy environment. However there is no clear
relationship between these residuals and therefore I cannot conclude that the impact of aid on growth is a
function of the level of policy.
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Diagram Two

Looking at the pure aid-growth relationship, initially (regressions D and F) aid appears to have a negative
effect on growth but this loses most of its significance once the additional aid-policy variables are added
(regressions E and G). As a result I cannot robustly conclude anything about the nature of the aid-growth
relationship, which is in line with much of the empirical literature.

7. Extensions
Extensions to this paper would certainly touch on the impact of differing types of aid, for instance looking
at the differences between bilateral and multilateral aid, the latter more often intended for developmental
purposes. Minoiu and Reddy (2009) find that multilateral aid positively affects growth over the long run;
it would be pertinent to fully explore the impact of different policy environments in this context.
Secondly I would recommend developing a dataset with a sufficient quantity of data to allow lagging of
the policy variable as it would be interesting to look at the impact of aid conditional on the policies in
which the aid was given (as opposed to the current policy environment which was a necessary limitation
of my dataset). Finally further work would also focus on looking in more detail at cross-country
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differences (e.g. what exactly is it about Botswana that enables aid to be effective in this instance?) in
order to further understand and apply the lessons from aid disbursement over the last 45 years to ensure
that aid is more successful at promoting growth over the next 45 years.

8. Conclusion
In this paper I have considered two aspects of the aid debate; whether aid affects growth over the long run
and whether aid is more effective in the presence of good policies. This paper adds to the growing
literature that finds that Burnside and Dollar’s 2000 result is not robust to a change in specification as I
can find no evidence that aid is more effective in the presence of good policies. Overall I cannot conclude
whether aid’s effect on growth is positive or negative (or indeed whether there is an effect at all). This
does not mean that I recommend an immediate cessation of aid but rather emphasise its current
ineffectiveness in the majority of cases.
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10. Appendix
(1) Optimal Policy Tests
Table Six

F-test of joint
significance

Sub-Saharan Africa

Middle East and
North Africa

Asia

1.61

2.37*

0.47

* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level
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(2) Serial Correlation Tests (Breusch-Godfrey)
I test for serial correlation in the growth, aid and policy equations. I calculate this by predicting the
residuals from the equations and regressing it on the lag of the residual as well as all other variables. An
F-test on the lagged-residual will be significant if there is serial correlation.
Table Seven

F-test
(approx.)

Growth (aid
excluded)

Growth (aid
included)

Growth (aid and
aid*policy included)

Aid

Policy

1.1

0.1

0.2

43.7

0.5

These results clearly indicate that I should accept the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in all
equations apart from the aid equation.

(3) Unit Root Tests (Dickey-Fuller)
I test for a unit root in the aid, policy and growth variables. This involves regressing the change in the
variable on the variable’s previous value (a constant is also included to capture time trends, i.e. this is a
Model B test). One lag of change in the variable is also included to allow for serial correlation.

Significance Value

Growth
-12.98

Aid
-2.96

Table Eight
Policy
-4.21

The special critical value in this instance (at the 5%) level is -2.86 so in all three instances I cannot accept
the null hypothesis of a unit root.

(4) Endogeneity Tests (Durbin-Wu-Hausman)
(a) Policies-Growth
I first test for endogeneity between growth and policies. I use lagged policy variables as instruments, i.e.
lagged black market premium and lagged inflation. The logic behind this is that lagged policy is relevant
to current policy but not to current growth. Lagged education and lagged budget surplus are removed
because they cannot be assumed to be exogenous to current growth. My first stage is to calculate the
20
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policy regression and compute an F-test on the joint significance of the lagged policy variables
(instruments) which reveals they are relevant instruments (F-value = 28.5). I then predict the residuals
from the regression of policy on all exogenous variables and regress GDP per capita growth on all its
relevant variables (including policy) and the policy residuals. If growth and policy are endogenous then I
will find that the policy residuals are significant in this regression. My results indicate that this is not the
case (t = 0.32) so the policy index can be assumed to be orthogonal at the 5% level to the error term in the
growth equation (i.e. exogenous). I will therefore treat policy as exogenously determined in the growth
equation. The final step is to check that the instruments are exogenous from the growth equation and to do
this I use the Sargan test. This involves calculating the IV residuals and regressing these residuals on the
exogenous variables and the instruments. I then take the R2 (0.0127) and multiply it by the number of
observations (164) before comparing it (2.08) to a chi-squared distribution where m is the number of
endogenous variables (2) and k is the number of instruments (1):
?
5< ? ~ CDEF

I can use statistical tables to see that (at the 5% level) χ2 = 3.84. As 2.08 < 3.84 I cannot reject the null
hypothesis of instrument exogeneity. So the instruments used are relevant and exogenous so my DurbinWu-Hausman test is legitimate and I can confirm that I can treat policies as an exogenous variable in the
growth equation.

(b) Aid-Growth
I now use exactly the same procedure to test for endogeneity between aid and growth. This time I use
population, a dummy variable for the Franc zone, a dummy variable for Central America and a dummy
variable for Egypt as instruments (I hypothesise that these variables only belong in the aid equation).
When considering the growth equation without aid*policy interactive variables I find that these
instruments are relevant to aid (F=17.8). Computing the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (t = 0.90) reveals that
aid can be assumed to be orthogonal at the 5% level to the error term in the growth equation (i.e.
exogenous). I will therefore treat aid as exogenously determined in this growth equation (without the
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interactive aid*policy variable). Furthermore a Sargan test reveals an R2 of 0.003 using 148 observations
therefore nR2 = 0.47.
?
5< ? ~ CDEF

In this case k=1 and m=4 and I can use statistical tables to see that (at the 5% level) χ2 = 7.81. As 0.47 <
7.81 I cannot reject the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity. So my instruments are suitably
exogenous and relevant in this equation.

When considering the growth equation with aid*policy interactive variables I find that these instruments
(including population*policy) are relevant to aid (F=15.1) and to aid*policy (F=16.5) and furthermore a
Sargan test reveals an R2 of 0.0172 using 148 observations therefore nR2 = 2.55.
?
5< ? ~ CDEF

In this case k=2 and m=5 and I can use statistical tables to see that (at the 5% level) χ2 = 7.81. As 2.55 <
7.81 I cannot reject the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity. So my instruments are suitably
exogenous and relevant. Computing the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (F=0.62) reveals that aid and
aid*policy can be assumed to be orthogonal at the 5% level to the error term in this growth equation (i.e.
exogenous). I will therefore treat aid as exogenously determined in all growth equations.
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(5) Data Sources
Variable
GDP (per capita, absolute and
growth)
Official Development Assistance
(% of GDP)

Table Nine
Manipulation

Source
World Bank

Ln (absolute GDP)

World Bank

Divided by GDP (current $)

Budget surplus/deficit (% of
GDP)

World Bank (supplemented by
IMF)

Inflation (log)
Black Market Premium (log)
Education (number of students in
primary education as a
percentage of number of primary
age children)
M2 (% of GDP)
Ethnic fractionalisation
(probability that two randomly
chosen individuals belong to
different ethnic groups)
Institutional quality (score)
Population (log)

World Bank
Levine (1997)

Budget surplus (in local
currency) divided by
GDP (local currency)
Ln(1+π)
Ln (premium)

World Bank
World Bank
Levine (1997)
Knack and Keefer (1995)
World Bank

Ln (population)

(6) List of countries
Table Ten
Sub-Saharan Africa

Americas

Middle East/North Africa

Asia

Benin
Burkina Faso
Chad
Burundi
Cote d'Ivoire

Argentina
Bolivia
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica

Algeria
Egypt
Iran
Israel
Jordan

China
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Nepal

DRC

Dominica

Mauritania

Papua New Guinea

Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Malawi
Mali
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Togo
Zambia

Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

Oman
Tunisia

Philippines
Thailand
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(7) Outlier removal
Outliers were removed as a robustness check. The country/time periods removed include, for policy
outliers, Bolivia (1980-1984), DRC (1990-1994) and Nicaragua (1990-1994), for growth outliers,
Dominican Republic (1965-1969), Gabon (1970-1974) and Oman (1965-1969) and for aid outliers,
Nicaragua (1985-1989), Sierra Leone (2000-2004) and Rwanda (1990-1994).

(8) Robustness checks
i) Outliers excluded (same policy index)
Taking a very similar approach to the initial investigation I first consider the impact of the individual
policy variables on growth (see Table Eleven for results).
Table Eleven
All variables included

Inflation and education
removed
Estimation Method: OLS
Number of Observations: 177
R2: 0.35
Dependent Variable:
GDP p.c. growth
-0.45
(0.28)
-0.51
(0.92)
0.19
(0.15)
0.003
(0.003)
-1.68**
(0.67)
1.18
(0.96)
0.11*
(0.06)

Estimation Method: OLS
Number of Observations: 164
R2: 0.38
Dependent Variable:
GDP p.c. growth
-0.73**
Initial GDP
(0.32)
-0.68
Ethnic fractionalisation
(0.96)
0.24
Institutional Quality
(0.16)
0.001
M2/GDP (lagged)
(0.002)
-1.69**
Sub-Saharan Africa
(0.66)
0.96
East Asia
(1.02)
0.11**
Budget Surplus
(0.06)
-1.44
Inflation
(1.06)
-0.26**
Black Market Premium
(0.12)
0.01
Education
(0.01)
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level

24

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol7/iss1/5

-0.33**
(0.12)
-

24

Morley: Aid, Policies and Long-Run Growth

I can therefore compute the following policy index:
   3.00 % 0.26 ) * + ,

- . /-01 /0.2. – 1.44 ) * 5+ 15

 0.11 ) 72801 92/2:  0.01 ) ;82

15 < 10

Using this new policy index I repeat my analysis and look at the impact of aid on growth. From
regression (D – Table Twelve) I can see that aid has a considerable (and, in this instance, significant at the
5% level) negative effect on growth:
=)
 %0.16
= )
There are many reasons why aid may have a negative effect on growth, some of which were considered in
the literature review. However when I consider the effect of aid in differing policy environments (E –
Table Twelve);
=)
 %0.13  0.01 )  
= )
Neither of these coefficients can be considered to be statistically different from zero at the 5% level
(although the estimate of the pure aid-growth relationship is significant at the 10% level).

ii) Outliers excluded (different policy index)
Removing black market premium and budget surplus from consideration results in the following policy
index (see Table Eleven for results):
   3.45 % 0.33 ) * + ,

- . /-01 /0.2.  0.11 ) 72801 92/2:

Using this new policy index I repeat my analysis and look at the impact of aid on growth. From
regression (F - Table Twelve) I can see that aid again has a considerable (and significant at the 5% level)
negative effect on growth:
=)
 %0.18
= )
However when I consider the effect of aid in differing policy environments (G – Table Twelve);
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=)
 %0.13 % 0.02 )  
= )
Once again I find that neither of these coefficients can be considered to be statistically different from
zero.

Initial GDP
Ethnic
Fractionalisation
Institutions
Sub-Saharan
Africa
East Asia
Money (lagged)
Policy
Aid
Aid (lagged one
period)
Aid (lagged
two/three
periods)
Aid*Policy
Aid (lagged one
period)*Policy
Aid (lagged
two/three
periods)*Policy
Prob > F
(on results in bold)

(D)
Estimation
Method: OLS
Number of
Observations: 135
R2: 0.39
Dependent
Variable: GDP
p.c. growth
-1.03**
(0.36)
-1.19
(1.09)
0.42**
(0.16)
-1.10
(0.88)
1.07
(1.29)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01**
(0.004)
-0.27**
(0.09)
0.28**
(0.10)

(E)
Estimation
Method: OLS
Number of
Observations: 135
R2: 0.41
Dependent
Variable: GDP
p.c. growth
-1.20**
(0.36)
-1.38
(1.09)
0.42**
(0.16)
-1.31
(0.89)
0.94
(1.34)
0.01
(0.01)
0.002
(0.01)
-0.13
(0.12)
0.12
(0.13)

(F)
Estimation
Method: OLS
Number of
Observations: 140
R2: 0.39
Dependent
Variable: GDP
p.c. growth
-1.18**
(0.37)
-0.72
(1.08)
0.27*
(0.16)
-1.37
(0.85)
0.31
(1.30)
0.02
(0.01)
0.91**
(0.33)
-0.21**
(0.09)
0.19*
(0.10)

Table Twelve
(G)
Estimation
Method: OLS
Number of
Observations: 140
R2: 0.39
Dependent
Variable: GDP
p.c. growth
-1.19**
(0.38)
-0.68
(1.05)
0.26
(0.17)
-1.37
(0.85)
0.19
(1.33)
0.02
(0.02)
0.98**
(0.45)
-0.25
(0.29)
0.25
(0.53)

-0.17**
(0.09)

-0.12
(0.10)

-0.16**
(0.08)

-0.12
(0.44)

-

0.01*
(0.004)
-0.01*
(0.01)

-

0.02
(0.11)
-0.03
(0.18)

-

0.01
(0.01)

-

-0.02
(0.16)

0.002

0.004

0.002

0.01

* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level
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